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 Benjamin Franklin opined that “in this world nothing 
can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”1  But the 
advent of the “all events” test renders Franklin’s 
pronouncement at best partially correct. 
 
 The Tax Code does not limit the availability of 
deductions to expenses for which payment is certain.  Rather, 
accrual method taxpayers are expressly permitted to deduct 
expenses before they are paid, so long as “all events have 
occurred which determine the fact of liability and the amount 
of such liability can be determined with reasonable 
accuracy.”2  A codified legal fiction affords taxpayers even 
greater flexibility in the realm of recurring expenses, for 
which an anticipated liability may be deemed “incurred” even 
if the predicate costs are not themselves incurred during the 
year a deduction is claimed.3 
 
 Here, by disallowing deductions claimed by a 
supermarket chain based on rewards shoppers had earned but 
not yet redeemed, the Tax Court misapplied the “all events” 
test as it applies to recurring expenses.  For that reason, we 
will reverse and remand this case to the Tax Court with 
instructions to grant judgment in favor of Giant Eagle, Inc., 
and its subsidiaries (collectively, Giant Eagle) on the basis 
that the claimed deductions are permissible under the “all 
events” test. 
I. 
                                              
1 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 
1789), in 10 The Writings of Benjamin Franklin 69 (Albert Henry Smith 
ed. 1907). 
2 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(4). 
3 Id. § 461(h)(3)(A). 
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 Giant Eagle operates a chain of retail supermarkets, 
pharmacies, gas stations, and convenience stores in the 
Northeastern and Midwestern United States.  Giant Eagle 
uses the accrual method of accounting to determine and report 
its income tax liability.4 
 
A. 
 Giant Eagle’s fuel rewards program traces its origins 
to the supermarket chain’s introduction in 1991 of a 
customer-loyalty program called Advantage Cards.  Initially, 
customers who presented an Advantage Card at checkout 
received discounts on promotion items and/or entire 
purchases.  Then, in response to skyrocketing gasoline prices 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Giant Eagle opened 
gasoline stations on the premises of many of its supermarkets, 
where Advantage Cardholders received discounts on the 
purchase of gasoline, ranging from three to seven cents per 
gallon.  However, Giant Eagle incurred significant losses on 
its first few years of gasoline sales, and the fuel discounts 
failed to increase supermarket traffic. 
 
 In April 2004, Giant Eagle revised the Advantage Card 
program.  The new program, called “fuelperks!”, linked 
customers’ rewards at the pump to prior grocery purchases, 
i.e., for every $50 spent on qualifying groceries, an 
Advantage Cardholder earned a ten cents-per-gallon discount 
on gas.  A brochure distributed to customers set out the 
program’s ground rules, including that “discounts expire on 
the last day of the month, 3 months after they are earned,” 
                                              
4 Giant Eagle, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, filed a consolidated 
income tax return accounting for its subsidiaries’ revenue and liabilities 
during each tax year at issue. 
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and that “[t]he promotion is valid for a limited time only and 
may end at any time without prior notice.”  Giant Eagle did 
not in fact end the promotion or revoke any accumulated 
discounts in 2006 or 2007, the tax years at issue.  Moreover, 
fuelperks! led to a dramatic increase in Giant Eagle’s 
supermarket sales. 
 
B. 
 On its 2006 and 2007 corporate income tax returns, 
Giant Eagle claimed a deduction for the discounts its 
customers had accumulated but, at year’s end, had not yet 
applied to fuel purchases.  Giant Eagle computed the 
deduction by (1) ascertaining the total dollar amount spent at 
its supermarkets on discount-qualifying items, (2) dividing 
that figure by 50 to determine the number of outstanding 
accumulated discounts, and (3) multiplying the quotient by 
$.10 to determine the face value of the discounts.  Next, Giant 
Eagle (4) multiplied the discounts’ face value by the historical 
redemption rate of discounts in their expiring month, and 
(5) multiplied that product by the average number of gallons 
purchased in a discounted fuel sale. 
 
 From the outset of the fuelperks! program, Giant Eagle 
tracked customers’ redemption of accumulated discounts and 
used the historical averages to determine the amount of the 
claimed deductions.  Thus, it did not base its computations of 
(4) and (5) on the number of discounts actually redeemed or 
the number of gallons of gasoline actually sold in the three 
months after year’s end.  The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue disallowed the deductions for the 2006 and 2007 tax 
years, which totaled $3,358,226 and $313,490, respectively. 
C. 
 6 
 
 Giant Eagle petitioned the U.S. Tax Court for 
redetermination of its 2006 and 2007 income tax liabilities on 
two grounds.  First, it argued that the discounts accumulated 
but not applied by year’s end satisfied the “all events” test 
because Giant Eagle’s liability became fixed upon issuance of 
the discounts.  Alternatively, Giant Eagle urged that the 
accrued discounts be treated as sales-accompanying “trading 
stamps or premium coupons,” enabling it to offset the 
estimated costs against gross receipts from grocery sales.5 
 
 The Tax Court rejected both arguments.  It found that 
Giant Eagle’s claimed deductions did not satisfy the “all 
events” test because the purchase of gasoline functioned as a 
condition precedent to customers’ redemption of discounts 
earned at checkout.  Accordingly, the court reasoned, any 
fuelperks!-related liability became fixed only after customers 
applied the accumulated discounts to a fuel purchase, which, 
in the case of the disallowed deductions, occurred after the 
end of the tax year.  Additionally, the Tax Court held that the 
Treasury Regulation governing “trading stamps” did not 
apply to the discounts that Giant Eagle customers accrued 
through fuelperks! because the gasoline discounts were not 
redeemable in “merchandise, cash, or other property,” as 
required under a 1978 revenue ruling.6  For these reasons, the 
Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s deficiency 
determinations for both tax years.   
 
 Giant Eagle appealed. 
                                              
5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-4(a)(1). 
6 See Rev. Rul. 78-212, 1978-1 C.B. 139. 
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II.7 
 The “all events” test derives from dictum in a 1926 
Supreme Court decision, explaining that a liability may 
accrue even “in advance of the assessment of a tax” if “all the 
events [] occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine 
the liability of the taxpayer to pay it.”8  The test has since 
been refined, prescribed as a Treasury Regulation, and 
eventually codified.  Today, 26 U.S.C. § 461 and its 
implementing regulations limit accrual method taxpayers’ 
deductibility of liabilities as follows: 
 
Under an accrual method of accounting, a 
liability . . . is incurred, and generally is taken 
into account for Federal income tax purposes, in 
the taxable year in which all the events have 
occurred that establish the fact of the liability, 
the amount of the liability can be determined 
with reasonable accuracy, and economic 
performance has occurred with respect to the 
liability.9 
 
 The Treasury Secretary prescribed a supplementary 
regulation defining “economic performance” in the context of 
rebates and refunds: 
                                              
7 The Tax Court had jurisdiction over Giant Eagle’s petition pursuant to 
26 U.S.C. §§ 6213(a), 6214(a), and 7442.  We exercise exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  We review de novo 
whether a taxpayer has satisfied the “all events” test, see In re Harvard 
Indus., 568 F.3d 444, 450 (3d Cir. 2009), but we review the Tax Court’s 
factual findings for clear error, see Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. 
Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 447 n.48 (3d Cir. 2012). 
8 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926). 
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i). 
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If the liability of a taxpayer is to pay a rebate, 
refund, or similar payment to another person 
(whether paid in property, money, or as a 
reduction in the price of goods or services to be 
provided in the future by the taxpayer), 
economic performance occurs as payment is 
made to the person to which the liability is 
owed.10 
 
 Nonetheless, “certain recurring items” are subject to a 
more relaxed version of the “all events” test: 
 
Notwithstanding [the general rule that “the all 
events test shall not be treated as met any earlier 
than when economic performance with respect 
to such item occurs”]11 an item shall be treated 
as incurred during any taxable year if— 
 
(i) the all events test with respect to such 
item is met during such taxable year 
(determined without regard to [26 U.S.C. 
§ 461(h)(1)]), 
 
(ii) economic performance with respect 
to such item occurs within the shorter 
of— 
 
                                              
10 Id. § 1.461-4(g)(3). 
11 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(1). 
 9 
 
(I) a reasonable period after the 
close of such taxable year,12 or 
 
(II) 8 ½ months after the close of 
such taxable year, 
 
(iii) such item is recurring in nature and 
the taxpayer consistently treats items of 
such kind as incurred in the taxable year 
in which the requirements of clause (i) 
are met, and 
 
(iv) either— 
 
(I) such item is not a material 
item, or 
 
(II) the accrual of such item in the 
taxable year in which the 
requirements of clause (i) are met 
results in a more proper match 
against income than accruing such 
item in the taxable year in which 
economic performance occurs.13 
 
For purposes of the “recurring item” exception, “the all 
events test is met with respect to any item if all events have 
occurred which determine the fact of liability and the amount 
                                              
12 A Treasury Regulation defines a “reasonable period” as “[t]he date the 
taxpayer files a timely (including extensions) return for that taxable 
year.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.461-5(b)(1)(ii)(A). 
13 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(3)(A). 
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of such liability can be determined with reasonable 
accuracy.”14 
 
 The Commissioner does not contest that fuelperks! 
rewards qualify as both “a rebate, refund, or similar payment” 
and a “recurring expense” subject to the less onerous 
“economic performance” requirement.  Moreover, the 
Commissioner concedes that Giant Eagle calculated its 
anticipated fuelperks!-related liability “with reasonable 
accuracy,” and that economic performance had occurred by 
the time of Giant Eagle’s tax filing.  Thus, the only issue on 
appeal is whether “the fact of liability” was fixed at year’s 
end15 -- that is, before the end of the tax year, had Giant Eagle 
become liable to pay the fuelperks! 10-cent discount to its 
customers who had purchased qualifying groceries with their 
Advantage Cards. 
 
A. 
 Two seminal Supreme Court decisions frame our 
discussion of the “all events” test’s fixed liability 
requirement.  In its first decision applying the “all events” test 
after its codification, the Court held, in United States v. 
Hughes Properties, Inc., that a casino operator was entitled to 
deduct the annual increase in its progressive jackpot payoff 
amounts, including for jackpots not won by year’s end.16  
While the Court acknowledged that there remained an 
                                              
14 Id. § 461(h)(4). 
15 Notably, the “matching requirement” contained in 26 U.S.C. § 
461(h)(3)(A)(iv)(II) is “deemed satisfied . . . [i]n the case of a liability 
described in [Treasury Regulation § 1.461-4](g)(3) (rebates and 
refunds).”  Treas. Reg. § 1.461-5(b)(5)(ii). 
16 476 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1986). 
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“extremely remote and speculative possibility [] that the 
jackpot might never be won,” it nonetheless concluded that 
the anticipated liability was “fixed” under Nevada law, which 
“forbade reducing the indicated payoff without paying the 
jackpot.”17 
 
 One year later, in United States v. General Dynamics 
Corp., the Court disallowed deductions claimed by a 
commercial taxpayer on the basis of its obligation to 
reimburse employees for medical expenses incurred by year’s 
end, but not yet submitted for reimbursement on an official 
claim form.18  The Court reasoned that because the taxpayer 
was “liable to pay for covered medical services only if 
properly documented claims forms were filed,” “[t]he filing 
of the claim [was] thus a true condition precedent to liability 
on the part of the taxpayer.”19  Though decided one year 
earlier, Hughes Properties expressly survives General 
Dynamics.  Whereas the casino operator in Hughes Properties 
“could not escape” its “fixed liability for the jackpot . . . as a 
matter of state law,”20 the General Dynamics Court 
emphasized that employees’ “[m]ere receipt of services . . . 
does not, in our judgment, constitute the last link in the chain 
of events creating [employer] liability.”21 
                                              
17 Id. at 601. 
18 481 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1987). 
19 Id. at 243-44 & n.5 (“[A] taxpayer may not deduct a liability that is 
contingent or contested.  Nor may a taxpayer deduct an estimate of an 
anticipated expense, no matter how statistically certain, if it is based on 
events that have not occurred by the close of the taxable year.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
20 476 U.S. at 601-02. 
21 Gen. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 244-45; but see id. at 249 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“In my view, the circumstances of this case differ little from 
those in Hughes Properties.”) 
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 Two of our sister circuit courts of appeals have 
helpfully construed these ostensibly discordant decisions.  
Most recently, in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
United States, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
life insurance company was entitled to claim deductions on 
the basis of future policyholder dividends, guaranteed by the 
company’s board of directors.22  The court explained that 
under Hughes Properties, the dividends constituted a fixed 
liability as of the board’s adoption of resolutions guaranteeing 
their payment, despite ensuing uncertainty as to which 
policyholders were entitled to the payments and the amount 
each policyholder would receive.23  In the court’s view, 
General Dynamics did not disturb Hughes Properties’ 
holding that a liability may be fixed in fact without being 
fixed as to the amount or date of payment; instead, the later 
decision merely precluded characterization of anticipated 
liabilities as “fixed” if “subject to some event that must occur 
for a liability to become due.”24  Because boardroom 
resolutions conclusively established the fact of the life 
insurance provider’s liability for future dividends, the court 
held that the anticipated liabilities were not subject to a 
condition precedent and therefore qualified as deductible 
expenses under the “all events” test.25 
                                              
22 782 F.3d 1354, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
23 See id. at 1365 (“[N]ot knowing the ultimate recipient of the payment 
does not prevent a liability from becoming fixed.” (citing, inter alia, 
Hughes Props., 476 U.S. at 601)). 
24 Id. (citing Gen. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 244). 
25 See id. at 1365, 1371.  The Federal Circuit distinguished a 
recent Second Circuit decision, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 724 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2013), disallowing policyholder 
dividend deductions on the ground that in that case payment 
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 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled on the 
issue of the “all events” test in Gold Coast Hotel & Casino v. 
United States.26  Relying on Hughes Properties’ 
acknowledgment of an “extremely remote and speculative 
possibility” that the deductible anticipated liability would 
never be paid, the court announced that, “for purposes of the 
‘all events’ test, what is critical is the existence of an absolute 
liability, not an absolute certainty the liability will be 
discharged by payment.”27  Thus, the court allowed a casino 
to deduct the value of its gamblers’ accumulated but as-yet-
unredeemed “slot club” rewards points, despite the high 
likelihood that some of the points accounted for as deductions 
would never be redeemed.28  Unlike the filing of a claim 
form, gamblers’ demand for payment was considered a mere 
technicality which did not involve third parties or require 
“proof of their right to payment,” and therefore did not 
constitute “a condition precedent to fixing Gold Coast’s 
liability for the value of accumulated slot club points.”29 
 
 Our sister courts’ approaches are consistent with our 
only reported decision on the subject.  In Lukens Steel Co. v. 
                                                                                                     
of the dividends was subject to various conditions precedent.  See Mass. 
Mut., 782 F.3d at 1364.  Unlike the ironclad payment guarantees 
resolved by the life insurance provider’s board of directors in 
Massachusetts Mutual, id. at 1365, the annual dividends credited to 
policyholders’ accounts in New York Life would not be paid out until the 
policies’ anniversary date, and only then if policyholders remained 
current on all premium payments, 724 F.3d at 258-59, 263-64. 
26 158 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 1998). 
27 Id. at 489. 
28 See id. at 490-91 (“[T]he data in the record suggests that only 69% of 
slot club points are actually redeemed.”). 
29 See id. at 490 (distinguishing Gen. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 244). 
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Commissioner, a case that predated codification of the “all 
events” test, we held that an accrual method taxpayer was 
entitled to deduct payments credited to a “contingent liability 
account,” even though they “would not be paid out 
immediately or at a specified time.”30  Critically, however, 
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, “[i]t 
was not possible for Lukens to cancel the contingent liability 
account without paying” the credited amounts.31  Because the 
taxpayer irrevocably committed to the payments during the 
tax year at issue, it was entitled to deduct corresponding 
future liabilities that “would be paid in a reasonable period of 
time.”32 
 
B. 
 As in Lukens Steel, here we determine whether the 
taxpayer’s anticipated liability was fixed at year’s end with 
reference to contract law principles.33  Specifically, Giant 
                                              
30 442 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (3d Cir. 1971) (“In similar situations it has 
been held that indeterminancy as to the time or amount of payment does 
not destroy the deductibility of an accrued item when the amount of 
liability is absolutely fixed.” (citations omitted)). 
31 Id. at 1134. 
32 Id. at 1135; accord Wash. Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279, 
1284 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (“[W]hen a group liability is involved, it is the 
certainty of the liability which is of the utmost importance in the all 
events test, and not necessarily either the certainty of the time over which 
payment will be made or the identity of the payees.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
33 Accord Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 198 (“Where a taxpayer’s 
obligations are set forth in a written agreement, the terms of the 
agreement are relevant in determining the events that fix the taxpayer’s 
obligation to pay.”).  To be sure, noncontractual obligations such as those 
contained in a statute or regulation may serve an analogous function, see 
Hughes Props., 476 U.S. at 596 (Nevada Gaming Commission 
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Eagle characterizes its issuance of fuelperks! rewards as a 
unilateral contract formed at checkout, which conferred 
instant liability on the supermarket chain to its customers for 
the rewards they accrued. 
 
 Unlike bilateral contracts, which are premised on 
reciprocal promises, “unilateral contracts . . . involve only one 
promise and are formed when one party makes a promise in 
exchange for the other party’s act or performance.  
Significantly, a unilateral contract is not formed and is, thus, 
unenforceable until such time as the offeree completes 
performance.”34  A unilateral contract also differs from an 
unenforceable contingent gift in that a reasonable person 
would understand that she could accept the offer and reap the 
promised reward simply by performing the task specified.35  
Thus, a Pennsylvania court held that a car dealership, 
advertising a discount on a future car purchase if a hole-in-
one was made on the ninth hole of a local golf course, was 
obligated to honor its “offer” when a golfer finally aced the 
hole—despite the dealership’s stated intention to end the 
promotion two days earlier.36  The court reasoned, “[i]t is the 
manifested intent of the offeror and not his subjective intent 
which determines the persons having the power to accept the 
offer.”37  Because “the offeror’s manifested intent, as it 
                                                                                                     
regulation); Gold Coast Hotel, 158 F.3d at 488 & n.6 (same), but the “all 
events” test does not require that liabilities be fixed by such external 
sources. 
34 First Home Sav. Bank, FSB v. Nernberg, 648 A.2d 9, 14 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1994) (internal citations omitted). 
35 See Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc., 561 A.2d 1248, 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1989); see also Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 774-75 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
36 Cobaugh, 561 A.2d at 1250. 
37 Id. at 1251 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 29 (1981)). 
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appeared from signs posted at the ninth tee, was that a hole-
in-one would win the car,” the dealer was liable in accordance 
with such reasonable expectations.38 
 
 So too might a Giant Eagle customer have reasonably 
presumed the redeemability of accumulated fuelperks! 
rewards, as provided by the well-publicized “Simple Program 
Guide”: 
 
 
                                              
38 Id. 
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The brochure distributed to Advantage Cardholders also 
included fine print providing, inter alia, that “discounted fuel 
cannot exceed 30 gallons and discounts must be used in full 
on one vehicle in one transaction”; “[t]he promotion is valid 
for a limited time and may end at any time without prior 
notice”; and “fuelperks! discounts expire 3 months after the 
last day of the month in which they’re earned.”  But none of 
the published program parameters suggested that Giant Eagle 
reserved the right to retract rewards that customers had 
already accrued.  Indeed, in the entire history of Giant Eagle’s 
fuel rewards program, “[n]o such retroactive termination ever 
occurred, or was even contemplated.”39 
 
 Like the golfer who teed off with a promise of reward 
in mind, a customer anticipated the promised fuel discounts 
when deciding to shop at Giant Eagle in the first place – and 
thus deciding not to shop at a different store.  Because she 
was then aware that she could apply the discounts as 
advertised if she spent fifty dollars on supermarket purchases 
using her Advantage Card, she was indeed a party to a 
unilateral contract with Giant Eagle.  Liability therefore 
attached upon her performance, i.e., at checkout. 
 
 For purposes of the “all events” test’s fixed liability 
prong, it is irrelevant that neither the total amount of Giant 
Eagle’s anticipated liability nor the identity of all the 
                                              
39 See Hughes Props., 476 U.S. at 604-05 (“None of the components that 
make up this parade of horribles, of course, took place here.”).  Nor 
could Giant Eagle have terminated the rewards retroactively “without an 
explicit reservation of the power to do so.”  Abbott v. Schnader, 
Harrison, Segal & Lewis, LLP, 805 A.2d 547, 558-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002); see Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
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customers who eventually applied discounts toward gasoline 
purchases could be conclusively identified at year’s end.40  
And while there remained an “extremely remote and 
speculative possibility” that the amount of Giant Eagle’s 
claimed deductions would overstate the value of the rewards 
its customers ultimately redeemed,41 Giant Eagle significantly 
mitigated that risk by tracking its customers’ monthly 
redemption rates and offsetting the deductions accordingly to 
account for prospective non-redeemers.  Giant Eagle amply 
demonstrated the existence—as of year’s end—of both an 
absolute liability and a near-certainty that the liability would 
soon be discharged by payment.  The chance of non-
redemption had been calculated by Giant Eagle “with 
reasonable accuracy” as conceded by the Commissioner.  The 
“all events” test demands no more.  We hold, therefore, that 
following Hughes Props. and Lukens Steel, Giant Eagle was 
entitled to deduct fuelperks!-related liabilities incurred during 
the tax years at issue. 
 
III. 
 By disallowing deductions claimed on the basis of 
established recurring expenses, the Tax Court effectively 
obliterated the distinction between two accounting methods 
expressly authorized by the Tax Code.42   The extent to which 
                                              
40 See Lukens Steel, 442 F.2d at 1134-35 (“[I]ndeterminancy as to the . . . 
amount of payment does not destroy the deductibility of an accrued item 
when the amount of liability is absolutely fixed.”); Mass. Mut., 782 F.3d 
at 1365 (“[N]ot knowing the ultimate recipient of the payment does not 
prevent a liability from becoming fixed.” (citing, inter alia, Hughes 
Props., 476 U.S. at 601)). 
41 See Hughes Props., 476 U.S. at 601. 
42 See 26 U.S.C. § 446(c)(2).  The accrual method of accounting differs 
fundamentally from its cash counterpart.  Whereas businesses that 
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cash and accrual methods of accounting sometimes yield 
different deductions is a byproduct of the Tax Code’s design.  
So long as a taxpayer consistently adheres to one accounting 
method, the Code is agnostic as to the benefit or hardship 
wrought by his selection.43 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Tax 
Court’s order sustaining the Commissioner’s deficiency 
determinations and remand this case with instructions to grant 
judgment in favor of Giant Eagle on the ground that the 
claimed deductions are permissible under the “all events” test. 
44 
                                                                                                     
choose the latter method refrain from counting revenues until they are 
received and expenses until they are paid, those using the accrual method 
account for transactions when they occur, regardless of when the money, 
goods, or services actually change hands. 
43 See 26 U.S.C. § 446(a), (b) (providing that the Treasury Department 
may only recalculate a taxpayer’s liabilities without respect to the 
accounting method regularly used in keeping his books if “no method of 
accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method 
used does not clearly reflect income”). 
44 Because we are reversing on the basis of the Tax Court’s 
misapplication of the “all events” test, we express no opinion concerning 
the soundness of its alternative holding that the Treasury Regulation 
governing “trading stamps” is inapplicable to fuelperks! rewards 
accompanying Giant Eagle supermarket purchases.  Nor do we discuss 
whether the Tax Court accorded Revenue Ruling 78-212 supererogatory 
deference.  Cf. In re WorldCom, Inc., 723 F.3d 346, 357 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 454 & n.9 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 251 F.3d 210, 214 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
No. 14-3961 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
The Court reverses the Tax Court’s order after finding 
that, at the close of the 2006 and 2007 taxable years for which 
Giant Eagle deducted anticipated fuelperks! expenses, “all 
events ha[d] occurred which determine[d] the fact” that it was 
liable to pay those expenses. 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(4). Because I 
believe Giant Eagle’s liabilities were not determined until 
fuelperks! were redeemed, I respectfully dissent.   
I 
The law applicable to this case is relatively clear. An 
accrual method taxpayer need not ascertain the amount of a 
liability,1 to whom it is owed,2 or when it will be paid3 in 
order for events to “determine the fact” of the liability and 
render it deductible. Instead, all that is required is that it 
became “fixed and absolute” in the taxable year for which the 
deduction is sought.4 United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 
476 U.S. 593, 600 (1986) (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., 
Gold Coast Hotel & Casino v. United States, 158 F.3d 484, 
489 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[F]or purposes of the ‘all events’ test, 
what is critical is the existence of an absolute liability . . . .”  
(emphasis removed)). 
Several cases explain what it means for a liability to be 
fixed and absolute. In United States v. Hughes Properties, 
Inc., a casino established the fact of its liability to make an 
additional slot machine payout by raising its progressive 
                                              
 1 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(4) (amount need only be 
“determined with reasonable accuracy”). 
 2 E.g., United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 
593, 602 (1986). 
 3 E.g., id. at 604. 
 4 Where a liability is fixed and absolute, neither a 
potential inability of the taxpayer to pay it (due to going out 
of business, loss of license, or bankruptcy) nor “an extremely 
remote and speculative possibility” that the liability will 
never come due negates that the liability is determined in fact. 
See Hughes Props., 476 U.S. at 601–02, 605–06. 
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jackpot under a Nevada law that prescribed “a fixed liability 
for the jackpot which it could not escape.” 476 U.S. at 602. In 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. United States, an 
insurance company determined the fact of its liability to make 
dividend payments to a class of policyholders after the board 
of directors “passed an absolute resolution to pay the 
guaranteed dividend and . . . at least some policyholders were 
already qualified recipients of that guarantee.” 782 F.3d 1354, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015). And in Lukens Steel Co. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a steel company 
established the fact of its liability to transfer funds from a 
contingent liability account to its employees by paying into 
the account under a collective bargaining agreement that 
obligated funds “to be used to pay benefits to [the company’s] 
eligible employees” and specified that “[i]n no event could 
the [account] be cancelled by” the company. 442 F.2d 1131, 
1134–35 (3d Cir. 1971). In each of these cases, events took 
place under a set of rules—imposed by law or contract—that 
established that the taxpayer was liable and would remain 
liable until payment was made. 
In an effort to identify rules that established Giant 
Eagle’s liability, the Majority turns to Pennsylvania’s 
common law of contracts and the terms and conditions of the 
fuelperks! program. Specifically, it applies the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court’s decision in Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc. to 
show that Giant Eagle entered into a unilateral contract with 
each shopper at checkout, thereby incurring liability to 
provide discounted gas at that time. 561 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989). The Majority notes that accrued fuelperks! 
were not expressly permitted to be, and never have been, 
retracted by Giant Eagle. Based on these observations, the 
Majority concludes that “Giant Eagle amply demonstrated the 
existence—as of year’s end—of both an absolute liability and 
a near-certainty that the liability would soon be discharged by 
payment.” Maj. Typescript at 16. While I agree with the 
Majority’s observations, I disagree with its conclusions.  
We have elsewhere applied Cobaugh for the 
proposition that an advertisement promising an opportunity to 
earn a benefit in exchange for performance can give rise to a 
unilateral contract. Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 772–73 
(3d Cir. 1999) (applying Cobaugh to an offer for “the 
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opportunity of becoming ‘Broadway’s New “Annie”’”). 
Accordingly, I am constrained by precedent to agree with my 
colleagues that, under Cobaugh, Giant Eagle’s advertisements 
constituted an offer to its shoppers to enter into a unilateral 
contract for the opportunity to redeem fuelperks! for 
discounted gas by purchasing $50 or more in groceries. See 
Hughes Props., 476 U.S. at 601–02 (applying state law to 
determine whether a casino’s liability was fixed). Qualifying 
purchases met the complete performance requirement and 
“[l]iability therefore attached upon . . .  performance, i.e., at 
checkout.” Maj. Typescript at 15.      
Nonetheless, the liabilities that accrued to Giant Eagle 
on account of its fuelperks! program were not absolute. The 
casino in Hughes Properties, the insurance company in 
Massachusetts Mutual, and the steel company in Lukens Steel 
all operated under a set of rules that offered no hope of escape 
from their fixed liabilities. In each case, those liabilities had 
to remain on their books until discharged by payment. Here, 
in contrast, Giant Eagle made each liability temporary by 
providing that “fuelperks! discounts expire 3 months after the 
last day of the month in which they’re earned.” App. 1161. If 
a shopper failed to redeem fuelperks! within that timeframe, 
the discounts were lost and Giant Eagle had no obligation to 
honor a belated attempt at redemption. After acknowledging 
this fact, the Majority offers reasons why we should 
nonetheless conclude that Giant Eagle faced “an absolute 
liability.” Maj. Typescript at 16. After careful consideration 
of those reasons, I remain unconvinced.  
 First, the Majority emphasizes that “none of the 
published program parameters suggested that Giant Eagle 
reserved the right to retract rewards that customers had 
already accrued” and “[n]o such retroactive termination ever 
occurred, or was even contemplated.” Id. at 14–15 (quotation 
omitted). While these statements are undoubtedly true, they 
do not change the fact that the company’s liabilities were 
extinguishable by another means. Like retraction, expiration 
has the effect of eliminating liability for the benefit of Giant 
Eagle.  
Second, the Majority notes that “it is irrelevant that 
neither the total amount of Giant Eagle’s anticipated liability 
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nor the identity of all the customers who eventually applied 
discounts toward gasoline purchases could be conclusively 
identified by year’s end.” Id. at 15 (emphasis removed). In 
my view, this comment reveals an analytical error, i.e., a 
conversion of Giant Eagle’s individual liabilities into a group 
liability. In order to establish that Giant Eagle faced a fixed 
liability, the Majority applies Cobaugh to conclude that the 
company entered into a unilateral contract at checkout with—
and therefore became liable to provide discounted gas to—
each shopper. Consequently, its liabilities were several and 
fixed on an individual basis. But the Majority later departs 
from that reality by treating the company’s numerous 
individual liabilities as an amalgamation. See Maj. Typescript 
at 15 (citing Lukens Steel and Massachusetts Mutual, cases 
that each involved a single group liability); see also id. at 16 
(“Giant Eagle amply demonstrated the existence—as of 
year’s end—of . . . an absolute liability” (emphasis added)). 
This errant tack is critical because whether liability is fixed 
on an individual or collective basis is a “significant” fact with 
the potential to “dictate . . . different outcome[s]” in our 
cases. Mass. Mut., 782 F.3d at 1364. Accordingly, I cannot 
agree with the Majority’s analysis, which perceives Giant 
Eagle’s liability as being fixed both on an individual and 
collective basis.   
As I see it, the question for our resolution is whether 
Giant Eagle’s liability to any individual shopper with 
accrued-but-not-yet-redeemed fuelperks! was certain to 
continue under the rules applicable to that liability until it was 
paid. Because one of those rules allowed for the expiration of 
each shopper’s fuelperks! (and Giant Eagle’s corresponding 
liability to that shopper), the answer is plainly “no.” While 
Giant Eagle became liable to a shopper at checkout, it did not 
become absolutely liable to that shopper unless and until the 
shopper redeemed fuelperks! prior to their expiration. For that 
reason, I would hold that, at the close of the 2006 and 2007 
taxable years, Giant Eagle faced many fixed liabilities for yet-
to-be-redeemed fuelperks!, but none that were “determine[d] 
in fact” because each was contingent upon future redemption 
by the shopper.   
 5 
 
* * * 
Had Giant Eagle not included an expiration provision 
in its terms and conditions, I would be inclined to agree with 
my colleagues that the company incurred a fixed and absolute 
liability to each shopper at checkout. In that case, we would 
face the difficult task of determining whether historical 
redemption data and other evidence reveal more than “an 
extremely remote and speculative possibility” that any given 
shopper would fail to timely redeem discounts and how much 
bearing, if any, the answer to that question has on whether the 
company’s liabilities were “determine[d] in fact.” Hughes 
Props., 476 U.S. at 601; see Gold Coast Hotel & Casino, 158 
F.3d at 489 (interpreting Hughes Properties to require at least 
a “reasonable expectancy” that the liability will be discharged 
by payment of cash or its equivalent). But the fact that the 
store did include an expiration provision—thereby 
conditioning its liability to each shopper upon fuelperks! 
redemption at a Giant Eagle-owned gas station within 
approximately 3 months’ time—made “redemption” a 
condition precedent to the establishment of an absolute 
liability. Because that event had not occurred by the close of 
the 2006 or 2007 taxable years with respect to the deductions 
Giant Eagle claimed on accrued-but-not-yet-redeemed 
fuelperks!, I would hold that the “all events” test was not 
satisfied and those anticipated expenses were not deductible. 
II 
In light of my view regarding Giant Eagle’s failure to 
satisfy the “all events” test, I turn to its alternative argument. 
Giant Eagle contends that its deductions were the functional 
equivalent of offsets to income permissible under a 
longstanding exception to the “all events” test. Pursuant to 
Treasury Regulation § 1.451–4(a)(1), “[i]f an accrual method 
taxpayer issues trading stamps or premium coupons with 
sales” that are redeemable “in merchandise, cash, or other 
property,” the taxpayer should “subtract from gross receipts” 
the estimated cost of redemption of those stamps and coupons 
in calculating taxable income.5 While it is undisputed that 
                                              
5 In effect, § 1.451–4(a)(1) allows a taxpayer to reduce 
its tax liability by writing off the expected future cost of such 
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fuelperks! are “issue[d] . . . with sales” of groceries, the 
parties contest the exception’s two other requirements: (1) 
whether fuelperks! qualify as “trading stamps or premium 
coupons” and (2) whether fuelperks! are redeemable “in 
merchandise, cash, or other property.” Because fuelperks! are 
not redeemable “in merchandise, cash, or other property,” I 
agree with the Tax Court and would hold that § 1.451–4(a)(1) 
does not authorize Giant Eagle’s deductions.   
In a 1978 revenue ruling, the IRS interpreted the 
phrase “in merchandise, cash, or other property” to imply an 
“unconditional” right of redemption, meaning that in order for 
a stamp or coupon to fall under § 1.451–4(a)(1) it must be 
“redeemable without additional consideration from the 
consumer.” Rev. Rul. 78-212, 1978-1 C.B. 139, *2 (1978). 
For that reason, the IRS advised a manufacturer that it “may 
not avail itself of [§ 1.451–4(a)(1)]” to account for the 
redemption of “coupons that entitle consumers to a discount 
on the sales price of certain products purchased in the future.” 
Id. at *1. Such coupons are not redeemable “in merchandise, 
cash, or other property” because their redemption is 
“conditioned on an additional purchase.” Id. at *2.  
In response to Revenue Ruling 78-212, Congress 
added § 466 to the Internal Revenue Code. That section 
authorized6 taxpayers to offset revenue with respect to a 
limited class of discount coupons—i.e., those which, inter 
alia, were redeemable for “a discount on the purchase price of 
                                                                                                     
trading stamp and premium coupon redemption—a result the 
“all events” test otherwise precludes with its prohibition of 
the deduction of contingent liabilities. See Capital One Fin. 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 136, 197 (2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Capital One Fin. Corp., & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 659 F.3d 
316 (4th Cir. 2011) (referring to § 1.451–4(a)(1) as an 
“exception” to the “all events” test and noting that “taxpayers 
are entitled to a present deduction for only that portion of the 
stamps or coupons that they expect to eventually be 
redeemed”).  
  
 6 Section 466 was repealed 8 years later by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 823(a), 100 Stat. 
2373.  
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merchandise or other tangible personal property.” Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.466-1(c)(1). In other words, in reconciling (1) its interest 
in the ability of companies to offset the cost of certain 
discount coupons with (2) the IRS’s interpretation of § 1.451–
4(a)(1) which precluded such offsets, Congress chose not to 
broaden the IRS’s interpretation. Instead, Congress passed a 
law which independently authorized those offsets and, in 
doing so, expressly drew a distinction between redemption in 
property (the nature of redemption that falls within the ambit 
of § 1.451–4(a)(1)) and redemption of a discount on the 
purchase price of property (the nature of redemption 
addressed by § 466)—a distinction it has drawn in other areas 
as well. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461–4(g)(3) (explaining that a 
“rebate, refund, or similar payment” can be paid “in property, 
money, or as a reduction in the price of goods or services” 
(emphasis added)).  
As advertised, a fuelperks! reward entitled its holder to 
“10¢ off every gallon of gas on your next fill-up at GetGo.” 
App. 1161. Therefore, the benefits provided by fuelperks! 
were discounts on the purchase price of gasoline, not an 
entitlement to gasoline itself or the discount’s cash value. 
This is true even though fuelperks! could be accumulated and 
redeemed en masse for free gas. In those situations, shoppers 
did not exchange fuelperks! for gas as such, but rather for a 
100% discount on the price of gas—a functional equivalent to 
be sure, but reflective of an important distinction respecting 
the nature of fuelperks! redeemability. It is this nature of 
redeemability—i.e., that fuelperks! can be exchanged only for 
discounts—that leads me to conclude that fuelperks! were not 
redeemable “in merchandise, cash, or other property.” Giant 
Eagle asks us to reject this conclusion for two reasons, neither 
of which I find persuasive.  
First, Giant Eagle argues that “discounts against gas” 
count as “other property” within the meaning of § 1.451–
4(a)(1) and the IRS’s contrary interpretation was “mistakenly 
viewed as persuasive” by the Tax Court. Giant Eagle Br. 60. I 
disagree because the notion that the phrase “in merchandise, 
cash, or other property” categorically excludes coupons 
redeemable for discounts is supported not only by the 
persuasive power of the IRS’s ruling, see, e.g., PSB Holdings, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 131, 142 (2007) (applying the 
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deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)), but also by the regulation’s text and its 
historical context. By enacting § 466, Congress responded to 
the IRS’s interpretation of § 1.451–4(a)(1) not by bringing 
discount coupons within its ambit, but by giving separate 
authorization to companies to offset the cost of coupons 
redeemable for “a discount on the purchase price of 
merchandise or other tangible property.” In doing so, 
Congress hewed to, and placed textual emphasis on, the 
distinction the IRS drew: that benefits redeemable “in” 
property do not include benefits redeemable for “a discount 
on the purchase price of” property.   
Second, Giant Eagle claims that fuelperks! were 
designed to (and did) generate grocery revenue—not fuel 
revenue—and that setting off the expected cost of fuelperks! 
redemption against grocery sales therefore accords with the 
purpose of § 1.451–4(a)(1), which is “to match sales revenues 
with the expenses incurred in generating those revenues.” 
Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 136, 197 (2009). 
I have no reason to doubt the company’s representations as to 
the purpose of the fuelperks! program or the impact it has had 
on revenues. Accordingly, I agree with Giant Eagle that the 
Tax Court’s application of § 1.451–4(a)(1) to fuelperks! led 
to a result that is at least somewhat incongruent with one of 
the regulation’s purposes. But this incongruity is the product 
of a faithful application of the requirements of § 1.451–
4(a)(1) to the facts of this case.  
III 
For the reasons stated, I would hold that the 2006 and 
2007 taxable year deductions Giant Eagle claimed on 
accrued-but-not-yet-redeemed fuelperks! neither satisfied the 
“all events” test nor qualified as offsets to income under 
§ 1.451–4(a)(1). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
